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Abstract
We study the detection of propagandistic text
fragments in news articles. Instead of merely
learning from input-output datapoints in train-
ing data, we introduce an approach to inject
declarative knowledge of fine-grained propa-
ganda techniques. We leverage declarative
knowledge expressed in both natural language
and first-order logic. The former refers to
the literal definition of each propaganda tech-
nique, which is utilized to get class represen-
tations for regularizing the model parameters.
The latter refers to logical consistency between
coarse- and fine- grained predictions, which
is used to regularize the training process with
propositional Boolean expressions. We con-
duct experiments on Propaganda Techniques
Corpus, a large manually annotated dataset
for fine-grained propaganda detection. Exper-
iments show that our method achieves supe-
rior performance, demonstrating that injecting
declarative knowledge can help the model to
make more accurate predictions.
1 Introduction
Propaganda is the approach deliberately designed
with specific purposes to influence the opinions
of readers. Different from the fake news which
is entirely made-up and refers to fabricated news
with no verifiable facts, propaganda conveys infor-
mation with strong emotion or somewhat biased,
albeit is possibly built upon an element of truth.
This characteristic makes propaganda more effec-
tive and unnoticed through the rise of social media
platforms. There are many propaganda techniques.
For instance, examples of propagandistic texts and
definitions of corresponding techniques are shown
in Figure 1.
We study the problem of fine-grained propa-
ganda detection in this work, which is possible
∗ Work is done during internship at Microsoft Research
Asia.
1. Appeal to fear: Seeking to build
support for an idea by instilling
anxiety.
Our convention occurs at a
moment of cr is i s for our
nation1, said Trump. “The
attacks on our police, and the
terrorism in our cities, threaten
our very way of life1.
3. Loaded language: Using
specific words and phrases with
strong emotional implications to
influence an audience.
“To all Americans tonight, in all
our cities and towns, I make this
promise: We Will Make
America Strong Again. We Will
Make America Proud Again.
We Will Make America Safe
Again. And We Will Make
America Great Again 3, 4.”
4. Slogan: A brief and striking
phrase that may include labeling
and stereotyping.
2. Repetition: Repeating the same
message over and over again.
Trump tweeted: “I’m building a
wall, OK? I’m building a wall2. I
am going to do very well with the
Hispanics, the Mexicans.”
Figure 1: An example of propagandistic texts, and defi-
nitions of corresponding propaganda techniques (Bold
denotes propagandistic texts).
thanks to the recent release of Propaganda Tech-
niques Corpus (Da San Martino et al., 2019). Dif-
ferent from earlier works (Rashkin et al., 2017;
Wang, 2017) that mainly study propaganda de-
tection at a coarse-grained level, namely predict-
ing whether a document is propagandistic or not,
the problem requires identification of tokens of
particular propaganda techniques in news articles.
Da San Martino et al. (2019) propose strong base-
lines in a multi-task learning manner, which are
trained by binary detection of propaganda at sen-
tence level and fine-grained propaganda detection
over 18 techniques at token level. Such data-driven
methods have the merits of convenient end-to-end
learning and strong generalization, however, they
cannot guarantee the consistency between sentence-
level and token-level predictions. In addition, it is
appealing to integrate human knowledge into data-
driven approaches.
In this paper, we introduce an approach named
LatexPRO that leverages logical and textual
knowledge for propaganda detection. Following
(Da San Martino et al., 2019), we develop a BERT-
based multi-task learning approach as the base
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model, which makes predictions for 18 propaganda
techniques at both sentence-level and token-level.
Based on that, we inject two types of knowledge
as additional objectives to regularize the learning
process. Specifically, we use logic knowledge by
transforming the consistency between sentence-
level and token-level predictions with propositional
Boolean expressions. Moreover, we use textual def-
inition of propaganda techniques by first represent-
ing each of them as a contextual vector and then
minimizing the distances to corresponding model
parameters in semantic space.
We conduct extensive experiments on Propa-
ganda Techniques Corpus (PTC) (Da San Martino
et al., 2019), a large manually annotated dataset for
fine-grained propaganda detection. Experiments
show that our knowledge augmented method sig-
nificantly improves a strong multi-task learning
approach. In particular, results show our model
greatly improves precision, demonstrating inject-
ing declarative knowledge expressed in both natural
language and first-order logic can help the model to
make more accurate predictions. What is more im-
portant, further analysis indicates that augmenting
the learning process with declarative knowledge
reduces the percentage of inconsistency in model
predictions.
The contributions of this paper are summarized
as follows:
• We introduce an approach to leverage declara-
tive knowledge expressed in both natural lan-
guage and first-order logic for fine-grained
propaganda techniques.
• We utilize both types of knowledge as regu-
larizers in the learning process, which enables
the model to make more consistent between
sentence-level and token-level predictions.
• Extensive experiments on the PTC dataset
(Da San Martino et al., 2019) demonstrate that
our method achieves superior performance
with high F1 and precision.
2 Task
Task Definition. Following previous work
(Da San Martino et al., 2019), we conduct
experiments on two different granularities tasks:
sentence-level classification (SLC) and fragment-
level classification (FLC). Formally, in both tasks,
the input is a plain-text document d containing a
Propaganda Technique Instances
Train Dev Test
Loaded Language 1,811 127 177
Name Calling,Labeling 931 68 86
Repetition 456 35 80
Doubt 423 23 44
Exaggeration,Minimisation 398 37 44
Flag-Waving 206 13 21
Appeal to fear-prejudice 187 32 20
Causal Oversimplification 170 24 7
Slogans 120 3 13
Black-and-White Fallacy 97 4 8
Appeal to Authority 91 2 23
Thought-terminating Cliches 70 4 5
Whataboutism 55 1 1
Reductio ad hitlerum 44 5 5
Red Herring 24 0 9
Straw Men 11 0 2
Obfus.,Int. Vagueness,Confusion 10 0 1
Bandwagon 10 2 1
Total 5,114 380 547
Table 1: The statistics of all 18 propaganda techniques.
sequence of characters and a set of propagandistic
fragments T , in that each propagandistic text frag-
ment is represented as a sequence of contiguous
characters t = [ti, ..., tj ] ⊆ d. For SLC, the target
is to predict whether a sentence is propagandistic
which can be regarded as a binary classification.
For FLC, the target is to predict a set S with
propagandistic fragments s = [sm, ..., sn] ⊆ d
and identify s ∈ S to one of the propagandistic
techniques.
Dataset. This paper utilizes Propaganda Tech-
niques Corpus (PTC) (Da San Martino et al., 2019)
for experiments. PTC is a manually annotated
dataset for fine-grained propaganda detection, con-
taining 293/ 57/ 101 articles and 14,857/ 2,108/
4,265 corresponding sentences for training, vali-
dation and testing, respectively. Each article is
annotated with the start and end of the propaganda
text span as well as the type of propaganda tech-
nique. As the annotations of the official testing set
are not publicly available, we divided the valida-
tion set into a validation set of 22 articles and a
test set of 35 articles. The statistics of all 18 pro-
paganda techniques and their frequencies (instance
per technique) is shown as Table 1.
Evaluation. For SLC task, we evaluate the mod-
els using precision, recall and F1 scores. As for
FLC task, we adopt the evaluation script provided
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Figure 2: Overview of our proposed model. A BERT-based multi-task learning approach is adopted to make predic-
tions for 18 propaganda techniques at both sentence-level and token-level. We introduce two types of knowledge
as additional objectives: (1) textual knowledge from literal definitions of propaganda techniques, and (2) logical
knowledge about the consistency between sentence-level and token-level predictions.
by Da San Martino et al. (2019) to calculate pre-
cision, recall and F1, in that giving partial credit
to imperfect matches at the character level. The
FLC task is evaluated on two kinds of measures:
(1) Full task is the overall task of detecting both
propagandistic fragments and identifying the tech-
nique, while (2) Spans is a special case of the Full
task, which only considers the spans of fragments
except for their propaganda techniques.
3 Method
In this section, we present our approach LatexPRO
that injects declarative knowledge of fine-grained
propaganda techniques into neural networks. A
high-level illustration is shown in Figure 2. We first
present our base model (§3.1), which is a multi-task
learning neural architecture that slightly extends
the model of (Da San Martino et al., 2019). After-
wards, we introduce ways to regularize the learning
process with textual knowledge from literal defini-
tions of propaganda techniques (§3.3 and logical
knowledge about the consistency between sentence-
level and token-level predictions (§3.2). Finally,
we describe the training and inference procedures
(§3.4).
3.1 Base Model
To better exploit the sentence-level information
and further help token-level prediction, we de-
velop a fine-grained multi-task method as our
base model, which makes predictions for 18 pro-
paganda techniques at both sentence-level and
token-level. Inspired by the success of pre-
trained language models on various natural lan-
guage processing downstream tasks, we adopt
BERT (Devlin et al., 2019) as the backbone
model here. To fine-tune the model, for each
sentence, the input sequence is modified as
“[CLS]sentence tokens[SEP ]”. Specifically, we
add 19 binary classifiers and one 19-way classi-
fier on top of BERT, where all classifiers are im-
plemented as linear layers. At sentence level, we
perform multiple binary classifications and this can
further support leveraging declarative knowledge.
The last representation of the special token [CLS]
which is regarded as a summary of the semantic
content of the input, is adopted to perform multiple
binary classifications, including one binary classifi-
cation of propaganda vs. non-propaganda
and 18 binary classifications of each propaganda
technique. We adopt sigmoid activation for each
binary classifier. At token level, the last repre-
sentation of each token is fed into a linear layer
to predict the propaganda technique over 19 cate-
gories (i.e., 18 categories of propaganda techniques
plus one category for “none of them”). We adopt
Softmax activation for the 19-way classifier. We
apply two different losses for this multi-task learn-
ing process, including the sentence-level loss Lsen
and the token-level loss Ltok. Lsen is the binary
cross-entropy loss of multiple binary classifications.
Ltok is the focal loss (Lin et al., 2017) of 19-way
classification for each token, which could address
class imbalance problem.
3.2 Inject Logical Knowledge
There are some implicit logical constraints be-
tween predictions. However, neural networks are
less interpretable and need to be trained with a
large amount of data to make it possible to learn
such implicit logic. Therefore, we consider to fur-
ther improve performance by using logic knowl-
edge. To this end, we propose to employ proposi-
tional Boolean expressions to explicitly regularize
the model with logic-driven objective, which im-
proves logical consistency between sentence-level
and token-level predictions, and makes our method
more interpretable. For instance, in this work, if a
propaganda class c is predicted by the multiple bi-
nary classifiers (indicates the sentence contains this
propaganda technique), then the token-level predic-
tions belonging to the propaganda class c should
also exist. We thus consider the propositional rule
F = A⇒ B, formulated as:
P (F ) = P (A⇒ B)
= ¬P (B) ∨ P (A)
= 1− P (B) + P (A)P (B)
= P (B)(P (A)− 1) + 1
(1)
where A and B are two variables. Specifically,
substituting fc(x) and gc(x) into above formula as
F = ∀c : fc(x) ⇒ gc(x), then the logic rule can
be written as:
P (F ) = P (gc(x))(P (fc(x))− 1) + 1 (2)
where x denotes the input, fc(x) is the binary clas-
sifier for propaganda class c, and gc(x) is the prob-
ability of fine-grained predictions that contains x
being category of c. gc(x) can be obtained by max-
pooling over all the probability of predictions for
class c. Note that the probabilities of the unpre-
dicted class are set to 0 to prevent any violation,
i.e., ensuring that each class has a probability cor-
responding to it. Our objective here is maximizing
P (F ), i.e., minimizing Llogic = −log (P (F )), to
improve logical consistency between coarse- and
fine-grained predictions.
3.3 Inject Textual Knowledge
Declarative knowledge in natural language, i.e.,
the literal definitions of propaganda techniques in
this work, can be regarded as somewhat textual
knowledge which contains useful semantic infor-
mation. To exploit this kind of knowledge, we
adopt an additional encoder to encode the literal
definition of each propaganda technique. Specif-
ically, for each definition, the input sequence is
modified as “[CLS]definition[SEP ]” and fed into
BERT. We adopt the last representation of the spe-
cial token [CLS] as each definition representation
D(ci) where ci represents the i-th propaganda tech-
nique class. We calculate Euclidean distance dist2
between each predicted propaganda category rep-
resentation W (ci) and definition representation
D(ci). Our objective is minimizing textual defi-
nition loss Ldef , which regularizes the model to
refine the propaganda category representations.
Ldef =
18∑
i=1
dist2 (W (ci), D(ci)) (3)
3.4 Training and Inference
Training. To train the whole model jointly, we in-
troduce a weighted sum of losses Lj which consists
of the token-level loss Ltok, fine-grained sentence-
level loss Lsen, textual definition loss Ldef and
logical loss Llogic:
Lj = α∗Ltok+β ∗ (Lsen + Ldef ∗ λ)+γ ∗Llogic
(4)
where hyper-parameters α, β, λ and γ are em-
ployed to control the tradeoff among losses. During
training, our goal is minimizing Lj using stochastic
gradient descent.
Inference. For the SLC task, our method with
a condition to predict “propaganda” only if the
probability of propagandistic binary classification
for the positive class is above 0.7. This threshold
is chosen according to the number of propaganda
and non-propaganda samples in the training dataset.
For the FLC task, to better use the coarse-grained
(sentence-level) information to guide fine-grained
(token-level) prediction, we design a way that can
be used to explicitly make constraints on 19-way
predictions when doing inference. Prediction prob-
abilities of 18 fine-grained binary classifications
Model
Spans Full Task
P R F1 P R F1 MC
BERT (Da San Martino et al., 2019) 50.39 46.09 48.15 27.92 27.27 27.60 -
MGN (Da San Martino et al., 2019) 51.16 47.27 49.14 30.10 29.37 29.73 -
LatexPRO 58.95 42.37 49.30 40.98 26.99 32.54 16.05
LatexPRO (T) 61.20 42.67 50.28 41.91 28.06 33.61 19.29
LatexPRO (L) 61.61 43.41 50.93 42.44 28.25 33.92 21.86
LatexPRO (T+L) 61.22 45.18 51.99 42.64 29.17 34.65 23.62
Table 2: Overall performance on fragment-level experiments (FLC task) in terms of Precision (P), recall (R) and
F1 scores on our test set. MC denotes the metric of consistency between sentence-level predictions and token-
level predictions. Full task is the overall task of detecting both propagandistic fragments and identifying the
technique, while Spans is a special case of the Full task, which only considers the spans of fragments except for
their propaganda techniques. Note that (T+L), (T), and (L) denote injecting of both textual and logical knowledge,
only textual knowledge, and only logical knowledge, respectively.
above 0.9 are set to 1, and vice versa to 0. Then
the Softmax probability of 19-way predictions (ex-
cept for the “none of them” class) of each token is
multiplied by the corresponding 18 probabilities of
propaganda techniques. This means that our model
only considers making predictions for the propa-
ganda techniques which are strongly confident the
sentence contains.
4 Experiments
4.1 Experimental Settings
In this paper, we conduct experiments on Propa-
ganda Techniques Corpus (PTC)1 (Da San Martino
et al., 2019) which is a large manually annotated
dataset for fine-grained propaganda detection, as
detailed in Section 2. We adopt F1 score as the
final metric to represent the model performance.
We select the best model on the dev dataset.
We adopt BERT base cased (Devlin et al., 2019)
as the pre-trained model. We implement our model
using Huggingface (Wolf et al., 2019). We use
AdamW as the optimizer. In our best model on the
dev dataset, the hyper-parameters in loss optimiza-
tion are set as α = 0.8, β = 0.2, λ = 0.001 and
γ = 0.001. We set the max sequence length to 256,
the batch size to 16, the learning rate to 3e-5 and
warmup steps to 500. We train our model for 20
epochs and adopt an early stopping strategy on the
average validation F1 score of Spans and Full Task
with patience of 5. For all experiments, we set the
1Note that the annotations of the official PTC test set
are not publicly available, thus we split the original dev set
into dev and test set as Section 2. We use the released code
(Da San Martino et al., 2019) to run the baseline.
random seed to be 42 for reproducibility.
4.2 Models for Comparison
We compare our proposed methods with several
baselines for fine-grained propaganda detection.
Moreover, three variants of our method are pro-
vided to reveal the impact of each component. The
notations of LatexPRO (T+L), LatexPRO (T), and
LatexPRO (L) denote our model which injects of
both textual and logical knowledge, only textual
knowledge and only logical knowledge, respec-
tively. Each of these models will be described as
follows.
BERT (Da San Martino et al., 2019) adds a
linear layer on the top of BERT, and is fine-tuned
on SLC and FLC tasks, respectively.
MGN (Da San Martino et al., 2019) is a multi-
task learning model, which regards the SLC task as
the main task and drive the FLC task on the basis
of the SLC task.
LatexPRO is our baseline model without lever-
aging declarative knowledge.
LatexPRO (T) arguments LatexPRO with
declarative textual knowledge in natural language,
i.e., the literal definitions of propaganda tech-
niques.
LatexPRO (L) injects logical knowledge by em-
ploying propositional Boolean expressions to ex-
plicitly regularize the model.
LatexPRO (T+L) is our full model in this paper.
4.3 Experiment Results and Analysis
Fragment-Level Propaganda Detection. The
results for the FLC task are shown in Table 2. Our
Propaganda Technique MGN LatexPRO LatexPRO (T+L)
P R F1 P R F1 P R F1
Appeal to Authority 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Appeal to fear-prejudice 8.41 18.26 11.52 15.69 14.90 15.28 13.53 14.90 14.18
Bandwagon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Black-and-White Fallacy 31.97 43.12 36.72 66.67 7.23 13.05 81.63 15.04 25.41
Causal Oversimplification 12.43 12.09 12.66 12.43 30.00 17.59 16.53 28.57 20.94
Doubt 27.12 12.38 17.00 18.06 9.09 12.09 40.82 9.26 15.10
Exaggeration,Minimisation 33.95 11.94 17.67 42.85 5.86 10.31 31.57 8.56 13.47
Flag-Waving 45.61 37.71 41.29 44.18 36.13 39.75 35.16 41.30 37.98
Loaded Language 37.20 46.45 41.31 51.69 39.19 44.58 50.28 44.39 47.15
Name Calling,Labeling 36.15 25.86 30.15 38.87 29.14 33.31 43.09 31.12 36.14
Obfus.,Int. Vagueness,Confusion 0 0 0 100.00 98.61 99.30 50.00 98.61 66.35
Red Herring 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Reductio ad hitlerum 45.40 49.02 47.14 99.85 59.88 74.87 100.00 45.74 62.77
Repetition 35.05 24.09 26.93 46.06 28.75 35.40 48.24 26.86 34.51
Slogans 30.10 31.25 30.66 44.30 38.46 41.17 41.53 43.43 42.46
Straw Men 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Thought-terminating Cliches 21.05 23.85 22.36 90.83 14.80 25.45 89.49 19.60 32.16
Whataboutism 0 0 0 9.09 66.50 15.99 18.75 14.50 16.35
Table 3: Detailed performance on the full task of fragment-level experiments (FLC task) on our test set. Precision
(P), recall (R) and F1 scores per technique are provided.
basic model LatexPRO has achieved better results
than other baseline models, which approves the
effectiveness of our fine-grained multi-task learn-
ing structure. It is worth noting that, our full
model LatexPRO (T+L) significantly outperforms
MGN by 10.06% precision and 2.85% F1 for Spans
task, 12.54% precision and 4.92% F1 for Full task,
which is considered as significant process on this
dataset. This demonstrates that leveraging declar-
ative knowledge in text and first-order logic helps
to predict the propaganda types more accurately.
Moreover, our ablated models LatexPRO (T) and
LatexPRO (L) both gain improvements over Lat-
exPRO, while LatexPRO (L) gains more improve-
ments than LatexPRO (T). This indicates that in-
jecting each kind of knowledge is useful, and the
effect of different kinds of knowledge can be su-
perimposed and uncoupled. It should be noted that,
compared with baseline models, our models have
achieved a superior performance thanks to high pre-
cision, but the recall slightly loses. This is mainly
because our models tend to make predictions for
the high confident propaganda types.
To further understand the performance of models
for the FLC task, we make a more detailed analy-
sis of each propaganda technique. Table 3 shows
detailed performance on the Full task. Our models
achieve precision and F1 improvements of almost
all the classes over baseline model, and can also pre-
dict some low-frequency propaganda techniques,
Model P R F1
Random 30.48 51.04 38.16
All-Propaganda 30.54 100.00 46.80
BERT (Da San Martino et al., 2019) 58.26 57.81 58.03
MGN (Da San Martino et al., 2019) 57.41 62.50 59.85
LatexPRO 56.18 69.79 62.25
LatexPRO (T) 58.33 67.50 62.58
LatexPRO (L) 56.53 73.17 63.79
LatexPRO (T+L) 59.04 71.66 64.74
Table 4: Results on sentence-level experiments (SLC
task) in terms of Precision (P), recall (R) and F1 scores
on our test set. Random is a baseline which predicts
randomly, and All-Propaganda is a baseline always pre-
dicts the propaganda class.
e.g., Whataboutism and Obfus.,Int. This
further demonstrates that our method can stress
class imbalance problem, and make more accurate
predictions.
Sentence-Level Propaganda Detection. Table
4 shows the performances of different models for
the SLC task. The results indicate that our model
achieves superior performances over other baseline
models. Compared to MGN, LatexPRO (T+L) in-
creases the precision by 1.63%, recall by 9.16%
and F1 score by 4.89%. This demonstrates the ef-
fectiveness of our model, and shows that our model
can find more positive samples which will further
benefit the token-level predictions for the FLC task.
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Figure 3: Qualitative comparison of 2 different
models on a news article. The baseline MGN
predicts spans of fragments with wrong propa-
ganda techniques, while our method can make
more accurate predictions. Here are 5 propa-
ganda techniques: 1.Thought-terminating
Cliches, 2.Loaded Language, 3.Causal
Oversimplification, 4.Flag waving and
5.Repetition. (Best viewed in color)
4.4 Effectiveness of Improving Consistency
We further define the following metric MC to mea-
sure the consistency between sentence-level pre-
dictions Yc which is a set of predicted propaganda
technique classes, and token-level predictions Yt
which is a set of predicted propaganda techniques
for input tokens:
MC(Yc, Yt) =
1
|Yt|
∑
yt∈Yt
1Yc(yt) (5)
where |Yt| denotes a normalizing factor, 1A(x) rep-
resents the indicator function:
1A(x) =
{
1 if x ∈ A
0 if x /∈ A (6)
Table 2 presents the consistency scores MC . The
higher the score indicates the better consistency.
Results illustrate that our methods with declarative
knowledge can substantially outperform the basic
model LatexPRO. Compared to the basic model,
our declarative knowledge augmented methods en-
rich the source information by introducing textual
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Figure 4: Visualization of confusion matrix result of
our LatexPRO (T+L), where O represents the none
of them class.
knowledge from propaganda definitions, and logi-
cal knowledge from implicit logical rules between
predictions, which enables the model to make more
consistent predictions.
4.5 Case Study
Figure 3 gives a qualitative comparison example
between MGN and our LatexPRO (T+L). Different
colors represent different propaganda techniques.
The results show that although MGN could pre-
dict the spans of fragments correctly, it fails to
identify their techniques to some extent. However,
our method shows promising results on both spans
and specific propaganda techniques, which further
confirms that our method can make more accurate
predictions.
4.6 Error Analysis
Although our model has achieved the best per-
formance, it still some types of propaganda
techniques are not identified, e.g., Appeal to
Authority and Red Herring as shown in Ta-
ble 3. To explore why our model LatexPRO (T+L)
cannot predict for those propaganda techniques, we
compute a confusion matrix for the Full Task of
FLC task, and visualize the confusion matrix us-
ing a heatmap as shown in Figure 4. We find that
most of the off-diagonal elements are in class O
which represents none of them. This demon-
strates most of the cases are wrongly classified
into O. We think this is due to the imbalance of
the propaganda and non-propaganda cate-
gories in the dataset. Similarly, Straw Men, Red
Herring and Whataboutism are the relatively
low frequency of classes. How to deal with the
class imbalance still needs further exploration.
5 Related work
Our work relates to fake news detection and the in-
jection of first-order logic into neural networks. We
will describe related studies in these two directions.
Fake news detection draws growing attention as
the spread of misinformation on social media be-
comes easier and leads to stronger influence. Vari-
ous types of fake news detection problems are intro-
duced. For example, there are 4-way classification
of news documents (Rashkin et al., 2017), and 6-
way classification of short statements (Wang, 2017).
There are also sentence-level fact checking prob-
lems with various genres of evidence, including nat-
ural language sentences from Wikipedia (Thorne
et al., 2018), semi-structured tables (Chen et al.,
2019), and images (Zlatkova et al., 2019; Naka-
mura et al., 2019). Our work studies propaganda de-
tection, a fine-grained problem that requires token-
level prediction over 18 fine-grained propaganda
techniques. The release of a large manually anno-
tated dataset (Da San Martino et al., 2019) makes
the development of large neural models possible,
and also triggers our work, which improves a stan-
dard multi-task learning approach by augmenting
declarative knowledge expressed in both natural
language and first-order logic.
Neural networks have the merits of convenient
end-to-end training and good generalization, how-
ever, they typically need a lot of training data and
are not interpretable. On the other hand, logic-
based expert systems are interpretable and require
less or no training data. It is appealing to leverage
the advantages from both worlds. In NLP commu-
nity, the injection of logic to neural network can be
generally divided into two groups. Methods in the
first group regularize neural network with logic-
driven loss functions (Xu et al., 2017; Fischer et al.,
2018; Li et al., 2019). For example, Rockta¨schel
et al. (2015) target on the problem of knowledge
base completion. After extracting and annotating
propositional logical rules about relations in knowl-
edge graph, they ground these rules to facts from
knowledge graph and add a differentiable training
loss function. Kruszewski et al. (2015) map text to
Boolean representations, and derive loss functions
based on implication at Boolean level for entail-
ment detection. Demeester et al. (2016) propose
lifted regularization for knowledge base comple-
tion to improve the logical loss functions to be
independent of the number of grounded instances
and to further extend to unseen constants, The ba-
sic idea is that hypernyms have ordering relations
and such relations correspond to component-wise
comparison in semantic vector space. Hu et al.
(2016) introduce a teacher-student model, where
the teacher model is a rule-regularized neural net-
work, whose predictions are used to teach the stu-
dent model. Wang and Poon (2018) generalize
virtual evidence (Pearl, 2014) to arbitrary potential
functions over inputs and outputs, and use deep
probabilistic logic to integrate indirection supervi-
sion into neural networks. More recently, Asai and
Hajishirzi (2020) regularize question answering
systems with symmetric consistency and symmet-
ric consistency. The former creates a symmetric
question by replacing words with their antonyms in
comparison question, while the latter is for causal
reasoning questions through creating new exam-
ples when positive causal relationship between two
cause-effect questions holds.
The second group is to incorporate logic-specific
modules into the inference process (Yang et al.,
2017; Dong et al., 2019). For example, Rockta¨schel
and Riedel (2017) target at the problem of knowl-
edge base completion, and use neural unification
modules to recursively construct model similar
to the backward chaining algorithm of Prolog.
Evans and Grefenstette (2018) develop a differen-
tiable model of forward chaining inference, where
weights represent a probability distribution over
clauses. Li and Srikumar (2019) inject logic-driven
neurons to existing neural networks by measur-
ing the degree of the head being true measured by
probabilistic soft logic (Kimmig et al., 2012). Our
approach belongs to the first direction, and to the
best of knowledge our work is the first one that
augments neural network with logical knowledge
for propaganda detection.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a fine-grained multi-
task learning approach, which leverages declara-
tive knowledge to detect propaganda techniques in
news articles. Specifically, the declarative knowl-
edge is expressed in both natural language and first-
order logic, which are used as regularizers to obtain
better propaganda representations and improve log-
ical consistency between coarse- and fine- grained
predictions, respectively. Extensive experiments on
the PTC dataset demonstrate that our knowledge
augmented method achieves superior performance
with more consistent between sentence-level and
token-level predictions.
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